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Climate policy: choosing the right instrument 











Climate protection should use environmental policy instruments that raise revenues, which 
can be used, for instance, to cut labour taxes to alleviate unemployment in economies 
suffering from high and persistent unemployment. This paper elaborates the possibilities of an 
employment dividend of climate policies and shows the potential importance of such a second 
dividend for a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of climate policy. It is argued that national 
attempts to reap such a double dividend may be bound to fail if resource suppliers can 
respond in a way that leads to a large-scale international reallocation of environmental rents. 
Only a internationally coordinated uniform base tax on CO2 that complements already 
existing emission trading systems could keep revenues from climate policy in those countries 
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1. Introduction 
The EU has promised in the Kyoto Protocol to reduce its CO2 emissions dioxide (including 
carbon equivalents of other greenhouse gases) from 1990 to 2012 by 8 percent. The overall 
environmental target having been proclaimed, national environmental policy is faced with the 
challenge to meet the respective national emission targets at minimum social cost. The less 
climate protection costs, the more funds will be available for other environmental, social or 
economic goals. 
The direct costs of reducing CO2 emission are minimized if the cost of avoiding one 
ton of CO2 is the same at every source of emission (see e.g. Baumol and Oates 1988). If this is 
not the case, costs could be saved by allowing those with higher marginal abatement costs to 
emit more and – respectively – those with lower marginal abatement costs to emit less. Cost-
efficient abatement can be achieved by introducing e.g. a uniform green tax. If, for instance, 
the government imposes a tax of 30 euros per ton of CO2, it would be beneficial for each 
emitter to avoid CO2 for as long as abatement cost per ton is lower than the corresponding tax 
rate. The same reasoning applies to tradable emission permits. At a permit price of 30 euros, it 
would be beneficial for each emitter to buy CO2 permits for as long as the abatement cost for 
one ton of CO2 is higher than 30 euros, irrelevant of whether the government initially 
distributes permits for free (“grandfathering”) or auctions them to the companies (see e.g. 
Tietenberg 2006a). 
But there is a difference with respect to public revenues. While green taxes or 
auctioned permits generate additional public revenues, the profits gained from grandfathered 
permits remain with the companies they have initially been distributed to. The difference is 
not only of distributive importance. If CO2 prevention can be achieved at minimum cost, it 
should be done in a way  by using the appropriate environmental instruments  that provides 
the government with the highest revenues. That way, an additional dividend can be reaped: as 
long as the government relies on other distortionary taxes to finance its expenses, green taxes 
as well as auctioned permits not only improve the environment but can be used to lower these 
other taxes and their disadvantages (see e.g. Schöb 2005). 
The attainment of a double dividend – the term traces back to David Pearce (1991) – 
was explicitly pronounced as part of the German green tax reform in 1999. By introducing the 
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green tax reform, the former red-green German government intended not only to increase the 
price of energy consumption but to recycle the additional tax revenues by cutting the 
contribution rate to the old-age pension system. According to the German Ministry of 
Finance, this double objective was in fact achieved. Thanks to the green tax reform, the 
contribution rate could be permanently lowered by 1.7 percentage points. The lower labour 
cost promoted labour demand and thus helped alleviating unemployment. The green tax 
reform reaped a double dividend as it reduced pollution and promoted employment.  
It is, therefore, all the more astonishing that the scope for a second dividend finds no 
mention in the re-surfaced discussion about cost and benefit of climate protection in the EU. 
This article reviews the possibilities of combining environmental protection with attaining 
one particular second dividend, namely an employment dividend in economies suffering from 
high and persistent unemployment. It aims at renewing the interest in exploring the potentials 
for a second dividend from environmental policies, taking into account the particularities of 
internationally coordinated climate policy measures and the joint use of green taxes and 
emission trading systems.  
Following a brief literature review in Section 2, we provide an introduction into the 
double-dividend theory in the presence of involuntary unemployment in Section 3. In Section 
4, we highlight the importance of government revenues by re-interpreting green tax 
instruments as an indicator for the degree of nationalizing the environment and appropriating 
the environmental rents. In Section 5, we exemplify the prospects of an employment dividend 
by looking at the German climate policy. As Section 6 will then demonstrate, the choice of 
appropriate environmental instruments to raise green revenues may be more limited when we 
take into account international reactions of the resource markets. Section 7 tries – under the 
assumption that the right environmental policy instruments are chosen – to quantify the 
potential employment dividend for Germany, highlighting that the way revenues from 
environmental policy measures are recycled is essential for the magnitude of an employment 
dividend. Section 8 briefly concludes. 
2. The double-dividend hypothesis: a brief literature review1 
Since Pigou (1920), it is widely accepted that environmental taxes are an efficient instrument 
                                                 
1 For more comprehensive surveys about the literature on the double dividend see Bovenberg (1999), Goulder 
(1997) or Schöb (2005). 
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to protect the environment, superior to the classical environmental policy instruments of 
command and control. Furthermore, tax revenues from environmental or green taxes can be 
used to cut other taxes so that environmental taxes not only improve the environment but also 
reduce the distortions of existing taxes on e.g. labour and capital income. This idea of a 
double benefit was first mentioned by Tullock (1967) and has been supported by partial 
equilibrium models in the eighties, developed by Nichols (1984), Terkla (1984) and Lee and 
Misiolek (1986). It is now well-known as the double dividend of green taxes. The main 
implication of this double-dividend hypothesis is that, if there is a general consensus about an 
environmental target, revenue-raising instruments are preferable to other environmental tax 
instruments that, although cost-efficient in regulating the environment, do not raise public 
revenues. 
Several authors who, based on the seminal paper by Sandmo (1975), analyzed the 
double dividend in a general equilibrium framework, were more sceptical (see e.g. Bovenberg 
and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994a, b, c) and Goulder (1995). Their 
research shows that increasing a narrow-based green tax and reducing a broad-based tax e.g. 
on labour income will typically increase the gross distortion of the tax system and conclude  
“that environmental taxes typically exacerbate, rather than alleviate, pre-existing 
distortions – even if revenues are employed to cut pre-existing distortionary 
taxes”. (Bovenberg and de Mooij 1994, p. 1085). 
This statement is certainly true but does not contradict the previous optimistic statement. 
Using tax revenues from green policy always allows to reduce other distortions. However, if 
the tax system was optimal without taking into account environmental concerns, total 
distortions, including the distortion of the green tax, must necessarily increase. While the 
former result is relevant for policy purposes because it stresses the importance of green 
revenues, the latter is of more theoretical interest. It implies that, due to pre-existing 
distortionary taxation, the environmental quality is already closer to the second-best optimum 
than the laissez-faire situation in a non-distorted economy. Thus, less severe reductions of 
environmental quality are necessary to reach the optimal environmental level (see Metcalf 
2003). 
The prospect of a double dividend is not only important for efficiency but also for 
redistributive reasons. Environmental taxes may have a regressive nature because low-income 
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persons largely consume environmentally harmful goods (see Smith 1992). In this case, 
redistributive objectives might lower the level of taxes on environmentally harmful 
commodities and affect the optimal way to reap a second dividend. Secondly, distributive 
considerations also influence the valuation of environmental damage. While the physical 
incidence of pollution is typically higher in low-income groups, e.g. due to bad housing 
situations, people who are well-off tend to put a higher value on environmental quality (see 
Harrison 1994). While Sandmo (1975) already raised this issue in his seminal paper, only 
very few papers have taken it on (see Schöb 2005 for further references). They show how 
redistributive concerns affect the way in which a second dividend can be generated without 
questioning the possibilities for a second dividend. 
Several simulations with numerical general equilibrium models confirm the theoretical 
insights and show, with particular concern to CO2 reduction targets that green taxes have, 
unlike e.g. grandfathered permits, the advantage of generating an additional revenue-recycling 
effect that allows the government to partly offset the tax base erosion effect (see Goulder, 
Parry and Burtraw 1997, Goulder, Parry, Williams and Burtraw 1999, Parry, Williams and 
Goulder 1999). Parry, Williams and Goulder (1999) summarize the results with respect to 
carbon abatement policies as follows: 
“Carbon taxes, as well as carbon quotas or tradable permits that are auctioned by 
the government, enjoy the revenue-recycling effect as long as the revenues 
obtained are used to finance cuts in marginal tax rates of distortionary taxes such 
as the income tax. In contrast, grandfathered (non-auctioned) carbon quotas and 
permits fail to raise revenues and thus cannot exploit the revenue-recycling effect. 
... the inability to make use of the revenue-recycling effect can put the latter 
policies at a substantial efficiency disadvantage relative to the former policies” 
(Parry, Williams and Goulder 1999, p. 53). 
It should be mentioned that the government not necessarily needs to actually raise revenues 
from environmental policy but rather that it can capture the rents generated by the 
environmental policy (see Fullerton and Metcalf 2001). We come back to this issue in Section 
4. 
All these results only hold for economies with competitive labour markets and, in so 
far as cuts in labour taxes were considered, focuses on labour supply reactions. For European 
countries, suffering from high involuntary unemployment due to insufficient labour demand, 
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the more interesting question is in how far green tax reforms could affect labour demand to 
boost employment? This question provoked the search for an employment dividend in its own 
right. In a model with fixed net-of-tax wages, Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1996, 1998a) 
show that if green taxes are low initially, employment may increase if substitution between 
labour and resources within the production sector is easy. Positive employment effects are 
also found in a search theoretic framework (see Bovenberg and van der Ploeg 1998b). In 
models with endogenous wage negotiations between trade unions and firms, Koskela and 
Schöb (1999) analyze the effects of a revenue-neutral green tax reform, which increases green 
taxes on the consumption of a polluting good, and show that unemployment is alleviated if 
unemployment benefits are nominally fixed and taxed at a lower rate than wage income. 
Koskela, Schöb and Sinn (1998) show in a similar framework that revenue-neutral tax 
reforms that raise green taxes on energy input and lower labour taxes lead to substitution of 
labour for energy and reduce marginal production cost for moderate energy tax rates. Both 
effects lead to an increase in labour demand and thus in employment. This in turn, however, 
increases the outside option for the trade union and leads to wage increases which, in turn, 
partly offset the initial employment gains. Holmlund and Kolm (2000) examine the role of 
environmental tax reforms in a small open economy with monopolistic competition and show 
for a two-sector economy that a revenue-neutral green tax reform boosts employment if wages 
in the tradable sector are higher than in the non-traded sector. In a bargaining model where the 
firm can invest in abatement technologies, Strand (1999) shows that when rebating green tax 
revenues by either subsidising firms‟ hiring or investments in abatement, pollution declines 
while employment may increase. 
Carraro, Galeotti and Gallo (1996) provide numerical simulations of the effects of a 
carbon tax reform in a bargaining model, which indicate some evidence in favour of an 
employment dividend in the short-run but not necessarily in the long-run (See Bosello, 
Carraro and Galeotti 2001 for further references). 
Maximizing the benefit from the „double dividend‟ requires the reduction of the most 
distortive taxes. In practise, however, revenues from environmental taxes quite often seem to 
be earmarked to particular green programs. Such earmarking runs counter to standard rules of 
efficient taxing and spending but may be justified as an instrument to overcome a time-
inconsistency problem in environmental policy (Marsiliani, and Renstrom 2000) or may be 
the outcome of the political process (Bös 2000, Brett and Keen 2002). Although earmarking is 
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inefficient in general, raising green revenues is still beneficial as it generates a non-optimal 
second dividend by increasing public goods such as environmental quality or improved public 
transportation. 
The brief review illustrates that there are several types of second dividends the 
government can reap from raising green revenues. In the following, we will focus on only one 
of them, i.e. the employment dividend. Most of the following discussion, however, easily 
carries over to other forms of a second dividend, regarding e.g. the deadweight loss of 
taxation, redistributive aspects or further environmental concerns.  
3. The two dividends of environmental policies 
To make the two dividends at work more transparent, we present a highly stylized model of 
an economy that produces one good Y that is entirely exported. The revenues are used to 
import a produced import good, which serves both public and private consumption, and to 
import a natural resource R, needed for production. The price of export good Y is p, which is 
measured in terms of a produced import good. This can be interpreted as the economy‟s 
“terms of trade”. The higher the price p, the more the country can buy for a given level of 
production. 
The good Y is produced by a single firm that faces monopolistic competition on the 
world market, i.e. it faces a downward sloping demand for its output.2 The good Y is produced 
with energy R, and labour L as inputs. While energy R is imported, labour L is internationally 
immobile. Technology is assumed to be linear-homogeneous. The country is „small‟ with 
respect to the resource import R so that its demand cannot affect the world market price for 
the resource. The labour market is characterized by a fixed net-of-tax wage. This may be due 
to minimum wages, wage bargaining or efficiency wages. This assumption is only made for 
the sake of the argument, as the results carry over – with some modifications not essential for 
our argument – to models in which the net-of-tax wage w is determined endogenously in 
wage negotiations between firms and trade unions, or where firms set efficiency wages (see 
Section 2). 
                                                 
2 For the following analysis, it is necessary that there are pure economic rents in equilibrium. This can be 
ensured by either assuming monopolistic competition on the product market or by assuming a third fixed factor. 
Without profits, it would not be possible to raise the wage above market-clearing levels in a small open economy 
(see Schöb 2005, p. 244). 
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The government can tax both energy and labour. Because both net-of-tax factor prices 
are fixed, the whole tax burden falls on firms so that the firm considers both the gross energy 
price qtq q )1(
~   and the gross wage rate wtw w )1(
~   as given. To guarantee a profit 
maximum, the output demand elasticity must exceed unity, i.e.   1, in which case profit 
maximisation implies that the firm will set a price that exceeds the constant marginal costs 
)~,~( qwc  by some mark-up. 
There are N workers in the economy, each providing one unit of labour. In the initial 
equilibrium firms demand only L workers so that there is involuntary unemployment. 
Furthermore, we assume that the initial equilibrium A is characterized by a tax system where 
only labour is taxed, i.e. we have .0 Aq
A
w tt  
In a first step, we consider the introduction of a green tax in isolation. Figure 1 
illustrates the case. In the initial equilibrium, the slope of the isoquant 0Y  equals the negative 
of the ratio of the tax-inclusive factor prices wq ~~ . In the initial equilibrium A we thus 
observe the factor price ratio wtq Aw )1(  . Since A is a point of tangency between the tax-
inclusive isocost curve and the isoquant, it characterises a cost minimum. Given q, w, tw
A
, 
there are many such cost minima on a ray from the origin through A, all of which have the 
same unit production cost, but because of the endogeneity of the output price p the 
monopolistically competitive firm can set, there is only one point that maximises profits, i.e. 
point A in Figure 1. Total cost of producing 0Y  in units of labour is measured by the distance 
0B.  
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Figure 1: Introducing a green tax 
 
When the government introduces a green tax 
qt , the isocost line pivots clockwise in point B, 




q )1()1(  . At this factor price ratio, the 
cost-minimizing production of 0Y  would be in point C because of the assumed linear-
homogeneity. At point C the firm produces at higher total and thus marginal cost, as can be 
seen from the fact that the isocost curve through C is above the one through B, which 
indicates the same total cost as in the initial equilibrium in point A. Profit-maximization will 
lead the firm to reduce production along the array through C. The point D indicates a new 
equilibrium. The exact location of D depends on how elastic the demand for the good Y is. 
The total effect on energy input AD RR  , which we interpret as the environmental dividend 
of a green tax, is the sum of substitution and scale effects. The effect on employment is 
ambiguous. While the substitution effect will raise employment, the scale effect will lower 
employment. In Figure 1, point D illustrates the special case where the employment effect is 
identically zero. 
The introduction of the tax reform raises revenues from taxing energy while labour tax 
revenues remain constant. If the government rebates additional tax revenues lump-sum, 
nothing else would happen in this market. The same is true if we consider a system of 
grandfathered permits where the price for the DR  permits increases the energy price by qtq . 
The allocation would be identical but the revenues for the permits would raise the income of 
those who first received it. 
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What happens if the government uses the green tax revenues to lower labour taxes? 
When we reduce the labour tax, the isocost curve would become even steeper since the new 
labour tax E
wt  would be smaller than the initial labour tax. Rather than looking at a steeper 
isocost line, for didactical purposes we consider a movement at the isocost curve through 
point D by looking at tax rate changes that leave the factor price ratio constant. This will be 
done in Figure 2. 
Figure 2: revenue-neutral introduction of a green tax 
 
The curve on the very right-hand side of Figure 2 shows the net-of-tax isocost curve, which is 
defined as the geometrical locus of factor combinations that would be attainable at a given 
expense if there were no taxes at all. The slope is given by wq . The net-of-tax isocost curve 
through A is steeper than the tax-inclusive isocost through A because 0Awt , and thus 
wqwtq Aw  )1( . The horizontal distance between A and the net-of-tax isocost equals the 
government‟s tax revenue in terms of R. The broken parallel to the net-of-tax isocost through 
A thus defines the geometrical locus of all potential equilibria, where tax revenue and net-of-
tax factor expenses are the same as in the labour-tax regime A when total cost are kept 
constant. 
In a first step, the government has introduced the green tax as in Figure 1, reaching 
point D. Assume that the government, in a second step, reduces both tax rates such that the 
factor price ratio remains the same as in point D. Total cost and marginal cost fall and the firm 
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will raise production. At point C, the tax rates would be so low that it becomes optimal again 
for the firm to produce 0Y , but with more labour and less energy. In this point, total and 
marginal cost would be the same as before but government revenues would still be higher 
than in A, because C is to the right of the net-of-tax isocost through A. Hence, the government 
can further reduce both taxes, shifting the new equilibrium further to the north-east along the 
array through D. Point E represents a possible equilibrium. In point E, we have the same tax 
revenues as in A but with a higher tax on energy and a lower tax on labour. 
Moving from A to E thus represents a revenue-neutral green tax reform. Concerning 
the environmental dividend, the positive scale effect would work against the substitution 
effect so that the environmental dividend of a comprehensive green tax reform is actually 
smaller than the environmental effect of an isolated increase in the green tax. With respect to 
employment, however, the scale effect now produces a strictly positive effect: by using the 
green tax revenues to reduce labour taxes, the government can reap a positive employment 
dividend. Note that because of the higher output, total domestic income also increases.3 
Figure 3: auctioning off permits 
 
Qualitatively the same result would occur if the government auctioned off DR  permits.4 If 
domestic energy consumption is fixed to DR , any rebate of the auction revenues would 
                                                 
3 For further elaboration, see Koskela, Schöb and Sinn (1998). 
4 If it would auction off R
E
 permits we would obtain the identical allocation. 
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increase the demand for energy and, because of the inelastic supply, the price for the permits 
would further rise. In Figure 3, this would lead to a move along the vertical line through D. In 
point F, the firms would produce the same output as in point A, but the government would 
still run a budget surplus and would continue to lower labour taxes. Point G above the 0Y  
isoquant may represent a new equilibrium where the firm produces a higher output at lower 
marginal cost. The distance DG represents the employment dividend when the environmental 
dividend is fixed to DA RR  . If we compare Figures 2 and 3, it becomes obvious that a 
stricter environmental policy may allow the government to increase both dividends – as long 
as the economy does not reach full employment. Comparing both figures with Figure 1 
illustrates the importance of public revenues for the overall efficiency of climate policy. It is 
thus worth giving this role some second thoughts. 
4. The role of public revenues 
Who owns the environment and who has a right to exploit it? As long as we take no climate 
protection measures, we leave the environment to the polluters: they are free to emit as much 
CO2 as they like; they take advantage by exploiting the environment without considering the 
costs they impose on others. They possess the (implicit) habitual right to the environment. In 
the first place, any environmental policy deprives the polluters of their „property rights“, it 
forbids them to further exploit the environment. To put it differently: environmental policy 
first of all implies the nationalization of the environment (cf. Schöb 1996). 
The choice of the environmental instrument – be it a charge, a green tax, a subsidy or a 
permit – determines to which extent the state then re-privatizes the rights to the environment. 
Green taxes as well as the complete auctioning of CO2 certificates leaves the property rights 
in the hands of the government, it extracts all rents from the exploitation of these rights. By 
contrast, in the case of grandfathered permits, the government receives no income from 
granting CO2 emission rights to polluters. This is like a partial re-privatization, given the 
amount of permits. With the proclaimed 8 percent reduction in mind and 92 percent state-
issued permits, the initial full nationalization of the environment is redone with a 92 percent 
re-privatization. The EU‟s waiving of the remaining 8 percent benefits those who suffer from 
climate change. To the extent to which the state no longer issues permits for free but auctions 
them off, it reduces the degree of re-privatization and raises public revenues from 
environmental exploitation. Public revenues from environmental policies thus indicate to 
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which extent the environment is nationalized. Whereas the degree of nationalization is 
irrelevant for cost efficiency, it affects the government‟s options to generate new sources of 
income and, consequently, a second dividend. The role of nationalization for reaping a second 
dividend, namely an employment dividend, is exemplified in what follows for the German 
climate policy. We proceed in two steps. First, we look at national climate policy in isolation 
and identify those policy instruments that may maximize the employment dividend. Then we 
include potential responses of international resource suppliers and show that in this case only 
a subset of instruments may continue to reap an employment dividend. 
5. The German national allocation plan and public revenues 
Germany has vowed to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 21 percent relative to the year 
1990. This objective is manifested in a national allocation plan. The allocation plan for the 
years 2008 – 2012 – illustrated in Figure 4 – determines the allocation of the total national 
emission budget for the next five years. 
Figure 4: The national allocation plan 2008-2012 
all greenhouse gases: m. t CO  equivalents972 2
total emissions
2008-2012
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2120.5
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traffic / households /
business / trade /











Source: Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (2006, S. 19) 
According to the national allocation plan 2008-2012, a total of 851.5 million tons of CO2 may 
be emitted per year. Other greenhouse gases can be emitted up to an amount having the same 
effect on the climate as the emission of 120.5 million tons of CO2. The permitted CO2 
emissions are being allocated to the aggregate sectors „traffic, private households, business, 
trade, services“ and „energy and industry“. In the first sector, 334 million tons of CO2 per 
year may be emitted, 517.5 million tons of CO2 in the second sector. The strict classification 
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as non-CO2-gases and CO2 as well as the strict allocation of the CO2 emissions to both sectors 
prevent an equilibrium of the marginal abatement costs among individual emitters and thus 
fail to achieve cost-efficient avoidance.  
Within the sector „traffic, private households, business, trade and services“. energy 
consumption is taxed by special green taxes already introduced stepwise since 1999.5 As a 
result – despite many exceptions – the exploitation rights and the corresponding income are 
being transferred to the state. As estimated by the Ministry of Finance, such income will 
amount to approx. 19 billion euros for the year 2008. For the sector „energy and industry“, the 
total amount of 482 million tons of CO2  per year will be allocated by emission trading, 90 
percent of which will be grandfathered to existing firms. 
Figure 5: Emission trading 
456  m.  t









Figure 5 models emission trading for two representative emitters and shows the development 
of the permit price in emission trading. The horizontal axis indicates the total emission 
amount to be allocated.6 The amount allocated to emitter A is plotted from left to right, the 
amount allocated to emitter B from right to left. The decreasing curve shows the marginal 
abatement cost (MAC) for emitter A, i.e. the cost of abating one additional ton of CO2. When 
emitting large amounts (we are far off to the right), the marginal abatement cost of avoiding 
one ton of CO2 is still very low. The more A already avoids, the higher the marginal 
                                                 
5 For a critical assessment see Böhringer and Schwager (2003). 
6 Contrary to Figure 4, the emission trading volume as reduced by the revision of the national allocation plan of 
only 456 million tons of CO2  is being considered here. 
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abatement cost become. The curve for emitter B is mirror-inverted. If the marginal abatement 
cost for avoiding one ton of CO2 is higher than the permit price, it pays to buy emission 
permits; if it‟s lower, it does not. The two marginal abatement cost curves thus represent the 
demand for permits by the two emitters. Trading the emission rights leads to the formation of 
a market price, which in September 2008 was at about 22.50 euros per ton of CO27 , and 
guarantees that the two emitters abate CO2 at minimum social cost. 
According to the German Minister for the Environment, Sigmar Gabriel, today 10 
percent of the permits are being auctioned off by the government – the maximum allowed by 
the EU. However, it is his proclaimed goal to auction off all permits from 2013 on, the start of 
the third national allocation plan. Assuming today‟s permit price of 22.50 euros per ton of 
CO2, the current public revenues from auctioning off permits amount to approx. 1 billion 
euros which would rise to approx. 10.2 billion euros per year with full auctioning. The grey 
area shows the maximum potential additional public revenues: full auctioning may yield an 
additional 9.2 billion euros per year in tax income. 
Instead of auctioning off the emission rights, the state could also impose a base tax on 
CO2 emissions in the sector „energy and industry“. At a tax of e.g. 20 euros the companies„ 
willingness to pay for permits would fall by 20 euros per ton of CO2, since they now compare 
the permit price plus tax with their own marginal abatement cost. The permit price will fall 
accordingly, as shown in Figure 6. 










                                                 
7 Current permit prices can be viewed at http://www.eex.com/de. 
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From a national point of view, any combination of a base tax and permit trading will lead to 
the same allocation as a pure emission trading system and yield the same additional amount of 
public revenues. As we will see in the next paragraph, this is no longer true when taking into 
account international reactions. 
6. Suppliers response 
CO2 emissions are strongly tied to the use of exhaustible resources. A comprehensive analysis 
of climate policy should therefore take into account the impact of green taxes on the world 
producer prices of exhaustible resources such as gas and oil products (see Amundsen and 
Schöb 1999). Since this paper focuses on the prospects of a second dividend, it is not the 
place to elaborate the consequences for the efficiency of environmental policy measures. This 
has been thoroughly discussed in Sinn (2008). The focus of this paper is on the international 
tax incidence: suppliers‟ responses may have severe impacts on national public revenues in 
countries that agree upon CO2 emission reduction targets and thus affect the prospects to reap 
a second dividend. As it turns out, not all of the instruments discussed in the last section that 
guarantee an employment dividend may be equally efficient when supplier responses are 
taken into account. This section thus wants to broaden the analysis of the question as to how 
climate policy can be designed to maximize the potential of reaping an employment dividend.  
Resource prices are principally determined by the user cost of the resource, i.e. the 
rent the resource owner obtains from extracting the resource (see e.g. Tietenberg 2006b). An 
energy tax, introduced by a sole country with a negligible share in global energy demand, 
does not affect the world energy price. It is therefore optimal for such a small country to 
proceed as described in the last subsection and try to maximize its public revenues. For the 
welfare analysis it is not necessary to incorporate the reactions on the world resource markets.  
If, as in the case of climate policy, all countries introduced CO2 emission targets, 
world demand for non-renewable resources, e.g. oil, would change quite dramatically and 
resource-extracting countries might react accordingly. The main underlying idea can again be 
described graphically. For simplicity, assume first that the whole oil stock can be used in one 
period only. If we abstract from extraction costs, this implies that consumers face a fixed 
supply R0. In the absence of pollution, it is optimal to extract the whole oil stock if the 
marginal willingness to pay at R0, MWP(R0) is positive. 
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Figure 7: Reduction of supply on the oil market 
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In Figure 7, the initial equilibrium is shown by point A. All oil is extracted and sold at price 
0p . If all the oil-consuming countries agree on a common climate policy that only allows the 
consumption of 1R , the determination of a global CO2 reduction goal automatically reduces 
global resource demand. The marginal willingness to pay for the resource drops from 
)( 1RMWP  to zero to the right of 1R .  
The kinked bold curve illustrates the new demand curve. How will the resource 
suppliers react? This, of course, depends on the market structure and the way in which 
suppliers compete. But at least for a monopolistic supplier, we can illustrate the optimal 
response. The monopolist will reduce extraction from 0R  to 1R  and offer this quantity at a 
fixed price )( 1
max RMWPp   as long as marginal revenues )( 1RMR  are still positive. At this 
price, the oil-consuming countries exactly demand the quantity of the resource that is allowed 
by an international climate policy agreement through emission trading. Accordingly, the price 
of emission permits drops to zero. The total revenues from the oil market are reaped by the 
monopolist, e.g. the OPEC, and the oil-consuming countries are left with no public revenues 
from their green policy and thus cannot reap any employment dividend. A pure emission 
trading system with auctioned permits thus runs the risk of the oil-extracting countries 
extracting the whole environmental rent.  
This vanishing of a second dividend can be avoided by levying a base-tax. If the oil-
importing countries not only agree on a reduction target 10 RR   but also on a uniform base 
tax t = BC, the OPEC will continue to sell the whole quantity 1R
8 but can only charge a price 
                                                 
8 This is the case as long as marginal revenues are positive at R1. 
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tRMWPp  )( 1
min . It will only reduce supply if marginal revenues for the OPEC at 1R  
were negative: the optimal tax t for a given emission reduction target is thus given by 
)( 1RMRt  . Such a policy guarantees the oil-consuming countries to keep tax revenues equal 
to 1Rt    without affecting the allocation. A base tax can thus ensure that the international tax 
incidence is shifted back to the oil-consuming countries, and to the public sector there. The 
employment dividend as explained in the last section thus remains possible to the extent the 
base tax allows the oil-consuming countries to fully extract the scarcity rent from introducing 
an emission reduction target. This is an idea that traces back to Bergstrom (1982) and has 
been explored for green taxes in Amundsen and Schöb (1999). 
To summarize: A second dividend can only be realized for the oil-importing countries 
to the extent their governments employ environmental instruments that generate domestic 
public revenues. From a purely national point of view, it makes no difference whether the 
government auctions off permits or prices them directly by imposing an additional base tax. 
In an international context, however, the advantages clearly lie in a base tax. A base tax only 
will enable the countries who actively participate in climate protection to also profit from it, 
in the sense that social costs induced by their climate policies are minimized. Since the 
introduction of a base tax is beneficial if resource owners can attract part of the resource rents 
and, at the worst, is equally good as auctioned permits, a base tax as a complement to already 
existing emission trading systems is of vital importance for those countries that engage in 
climate protection and want to do so at minimum domestic cost. 
The importance of an employment dividend shall be illustrated in the next section by 
looking at the prospects of an employment dividend for Germany. 
7. An illustration: an employment dividend for Germany 
As we have previously seen, the government can maximize its income from emission trading 
by raising an additional income of 9.2 billion euros per year when it auctions off all permits at 
the current price of 22.50 euros per ton of CO2. However, these additional public revenues are 
partially offset by tax losses. As long as permits are issued to the companies for free, their 
profits increase by 9.2 billion euros. If the permits will be auctioned, the firms‟ profits will 
sink at the same amount by which public revenues rise, and consequently also profit tax 
  20 
revenues. Assuming an average tax rate of 30 percent, tax losses in the amount of 2.8 billion 
euros are to be set against. That leaves a net 6.3 billion euros to be used to reduce other taxes.9 
A first alternative would be, along the lines of the German green tax reform of 1999, 
to use the additional tax revenues to reduce old-age insurance rates. In 2007, the income from 
national old-age pension scheme amounted to 8.7 billion euros per percentage point 
contribution rate. Accordingly, the additional net revenues from the auctioned emission rights 
allow the government to cut the old-age insurance contribution rate from currently 19.9 
percent to 19.2 percent. 
In order to determine the employment effect, at least two points are to be considered. 
First, the incidence of the cut of the old-age insurance contribution rate matters. The 
companies will only expand their labour demand to the extent at which lower contribution 
rates lower their wage costs. If the whole incidence falls on gross wages, these costs would 
sink by 0.62 percent. Second, the total employment effect depends on the labour demand 
elasticity. It indicates the percentage increase in employment in case of a one percent 
reduction in wage cost. For our simple model calculation we assume three different scenarios 
with different demand elasticities: 0,5, 0,75, and 1,0. 
If the whole incidence falls on gross wages, the employment effect would be between 
110.000 and 220.000. The intermediate scenario with a labour demand elasticity of 0.75 
would promise  162.000 additional jobs. In this scenario, the maximum employment dividend 
possible would increase the German labour force by almost 0.5 percent. If the whole 
incidence falls on net wages the employment effect would be zero but labour income would 
rise.  
Alternatively, one could target the subsidies on the low-wage sector as unemployment 
is the highest in this sector. Following the suggestion by Knabe and Schöb (2008) to fully 
subsidize social insurance rates paid by the employer for hourly wages below a threshold 
wage rate, and then to linearly melt off this subsidy up to 1.5 times the hourly wage, 
significantly higher employment effects could be achieved.  
To simulate the consequences of such a wage subsidy scheme being introduced in the 
current German welfare system, we use the distribution of gross hourly wages among 
                                                 
9 Considering the international reactions of a coordinated emission trade policy, grandfathered permits could 
prove to be of no value. In this case, no tax losses ought to be set off. 
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different types of employees derived from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) wave 
2006.10 We consider all full-time or part-time employees or those who work in a so-called 
“minijob” (jobs paid at less than 400 euros per month are partially exempted from social 
security contributions and taxes). Hourly wages are calculated by dividing reported gross 
income by the number of reported paid hours (contracted plus paid overtime hours). For all 
calculated wages below 3 euros, we assume an average hourly wage of 2.75 euros to account 
for measurement errors in the hours and wage data. 
Knowing the wage distribution and being able to calculate how employment changes 
affect the public budget, we can simulate the effect of a low wage subsidy as described above. 
For the intermediate scenario with a labour demand elasticity of 0.75, the corresponding 
potential employment dividend is illustrated in Figure 9. The threshold wage is thereby 
determined such that auction revenues are rebated in a revenue-neutral way through this 
subsidy scheme. Lower wage cost at the lower end of the wage distribution could create up to 
1.2 million new jobs in the low-wage sector (or 750,000 full-time equivalent jobs) in areas 
with an hourly gross wage of less than 12 euros. 
In the second scenario with low wage subsidies, the employment effect is seven times 
as high as with a uniform reduction wage subsidy when the whole incidence falls on the 
employer. The more efficiently additional public revenues from climate protection policy are 
used to follow other goals – in this case to increase and ensure employment – the higher the 
second employment dividend, and as a consequence, the higher political acceptance of 
climate policy may become. 
                                                 
10 For a detailed description of the GSOEP, see Wagner et al. (2007) and for details underlying the simulation 
results presented here, see Knabe and Schöb (2008). 
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As it turns out, the benefits of using green revenues from climate policy measures to reduce 
CO2 emissions may have a huge impact on the labour market. This section thus illustrates 
how important it is to include the prospects of a second dividend such as the employment 
dividend in a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of climate policy. Furthermore, it becomes 
transparent that the scope for an employment dividend essentially depends not only on 
whether climate policy generates public revenues that allow the government to lower wage 
costs, but also on institutional factors such as the bargaining system that in our example 
determines the incidence of wage subsidization, and on the technology that determines how 
elastic labour demand reacts to such a policy. 
8. Conclusion 
Climate protection goals should be achieved at minimum possible economic cost. This 
requires cost-efficient environmental policy measures that ensure that marginal abatement 
costs are equalized among all emitters. But that alone does not exhaust the full potential. A 
second dividend can be gained with a climate policy designed to ensure that income from 
environmental regulation goes to the public purse. At the same time, however, any isolated 
attempt by a single nation may be bound to fail. The risk that resource suppliers respond in a 
way that leads to a large-scale international reallocation of income – i.e. from oil-consuming 
to oil-producing countries – simply is too high. Avoiding this requires international 
coordination of emission reduction targets as well as of the instruments used. As proposed in 
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this article, an internationally set uniform base tax could ensure that revenues from climate 
policy remain in the oil-consuming countries and, thus, provide them with the option on a 
second dividend. How and to which extent such a second dividend can be realized will then 
be up to each country. 
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